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ARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS NECESSARY?
THE RETURN OF THE COMMENDA
By JUDSON A. CRANE*
A S TRADE employs capital, a need arises for a form of associa-
tion under which one can invest funds in an enterprise,
sharing profits, but without responsibility for management and
without risk of loss or liability beyond the amount invested. The
institution which met this need during the middle ages was called
the commenda. The commendator loaned money to the commen-
datarius or tractator to employ in trade. The commendator re-
ceived the major portion of the profits and had no claim for loss
not caused by the fault of the commendatarius.1 This institution
was recognized as the Soci6t6 en Commandite by an ordinance of
Louis XIV in 1673, and by the French Commercial Code of 1807.-
This was the basis of the limited partnership acts adopted in the
United States in the early eighteenth century.3
The general partnership, known as societas, the members be-
ing socii, was functioning during the middle ages in continental
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
28 Holdsworth, History of English Law 195; Mitchell, Early Forms
of Partnership, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-American Legal History 183.2Secs. 23-28. Sec. 23 defines the association, "La soci&ti en commandite
se contracte entre un ou plusieurs associds responsables et solidaires, et un or
plusieurs associis simples bailleurs de fonds, que l'on nomme commanditaires
ou associis en commandite." No provision is made for personal liability of
the commanditaires except in event of participation in management.
33 Kent, Commentaries, 33-36 notes that this was the first instance of
an American state deriving its statutory law from a country other than
England. Limited partnership acts were adopted in New York 1822; in
Connecticut, 1922; Pennsylvania, 1836. All the states except Arizona and
Florida have some form of limited partnership act. Nineteen have adopted
the uniform limited partnership act.
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Europe and in England especially among the foreign merchants.4
The commenda appears to have been known in England5 as well as
on the continent. But as the common law courts gradually took
jurisdiction over mercantile causes formerly dealt with in mer-
cantile courts, only the general partnership with joint liability of
all its members was recognized.' Holdsworth attributes the re-
jection of the commenda to several causes, the insularity of the
common law after it absorbed the law merchant,8 the exclusive-
ness of the trades controlled by regulated companies, the emer-
gence and popularity of joint stock companies, and legislative
opinion hostile to limited liability save by grant or franchise, as
in the corporation.9
4There are numerous references to socii in the early commercial cases
collected and translated in the Selden Society collection of Select Cases
on the Law Merchant. The Fair Court of St. Ives, (1293) 23 Selden So-
ciety 59; St. Ives, (1300) 23 Selden Society 77; St. Ives, (1287) 23 Selden
Society 25; St. Ives, (1317) 23 Selden Society 105; King's Council, (1273)
46 Selden Society 12; Assize at Lincoln, (1278) 46 Selden Society 18;
King's Council, (1284) 46 Selden Society 39; Itinerant Justices (1288) 46
Selden Society 45; Court of the Mayor of London on King's Writ, (1299)
49 Selden Society 14.
The first Usury Ordinance of the City of London (1363) imposed
liability for usury on "partners in the said bargains," Riley, Liber
Albus 320. The later ordinance of 1391 also refers to transactions by
partners, Riley, Liber Albus 346.
51 Select Cases on Law Merchant, 23 Selden Society 77, a case in the
Fair Court of St. Ives (1293), referred to by Mitchell, Early Forms of
Partnership, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-American Legal History 185, and 8
Holdsworth, History of English Law 195; (1291) 2 Select Cases on Law
Merchant, 46 Selden Society 45 and 53.
Holdsworth also infers a recognition of commenda in the London
Usury Ordinance (1391) Riley, Liber Albus 344, defining usury, "if any per-
son shall lend or put into the hands of any person gold or silver, to receive
gain thereby, or a promise for certain without risk . . . ." 8 Holdsworth,
History of English Law 104. Compare American Law Institute Contracts
Restatement section 527.6
"In many parts of Europe limited partnerships are admitted, provided
they be entered on a register; but the law of England is otherwise, the rule
being, that if a partner shares in advantages, he also shares in all disad-
vantages." Lord Loughborough in Coope v. Eyre, (1788) 1 H. BI. 37, 48.
See also Pollock, Essays in jurisprudence and Ethics 95, 101.
England did not adopt a Limited Partnership Act until 1907, 7 Edw.
VII, ch. 24.
78 Holdsworth, History of English Law 196.8The Law Merchant is a source of the common law of partnership,
especially the doctrine of non-survivorship of joint property on death of a
partner and the duty of the survivor to account. Hamond v. Jethro, (1611)
2 Brownl. 97, 99: Jeffereys v. Small, (1683) 1 Vernon 217; Lane v. Wil-
liams, (1692) 2 Vernon 277, 292; Devaynes v. Noble, (1816) 1 Mer. 529.
564, 624; 1 Coke's Lit., sec. 282; Burdick. What is the Law Merchant,(1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 470, 483, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-American Legal
History 34.9Compare the Texas views of business trusts as expressed in Thompson
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Along with the growth of the common law of partnership
there developed in England, starting with Grace v. Smith"0 and
Waugh v. Carver,' the doctrine of partnership liability to third
persons of anyone who shared the profits of a trade, including
lenders of capital who received a share of profits in lieu of interest.
It was recognized that not all such persons were partners inter se,
that is, not partners in fact, but for reasons of policy and expe-
diency it was deemed necessary to impose on them liabilities for
trade debts as if they were partners. This doctrine has had a wide
following in this country.' 2 In England a reaction began with Cox
v. Hickmaln,13 and it became the law that while profit sharing is a
prima facie indicium of partnership it is not conclusive, and one
may receive a share of profits, as payment of a debt, or in lieu of or
in addition to interest, without becoming a partner in fact or liable
as though a partner to third persons. The line of English cases
to this effect came too late to prevent the adoption in many
v. Schmitt, (1925) 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554; and cases on the liability of
members of unlicensed foreign corporations, as Cunnyngham v. Shelby,(1916) 136 Tenn. 176, 188 S. W. 1147.
10(1775) 2 IL BI. 998, De Gray, J., "Every man who has a share in
the profits of a trade ought also to bear his share of the loss."
31(1793) 2 H. BI. 235, Eyre, C. J., "It is plain upon the construction
of the agreement, if it be construed only between the Carvers and Geisler,
that they were not, nor ever meant to be partners .... But the question
is, whether they have not by parts of their agreement, constituted themselves
partners in respect to other persons."
Following Waugh v. Carver, (1793) 2 H. BI. 235, were many cases
including Hesketh v. Blanchard, (1803) 4 East 145; Smith v. Watson,(1824) 2 B. & C. 401, 2 L J. K. B. 0. S. 63, 3 Dow. & Ry. K. B. 751;
Barry v. Nesham, (1846) 3 C. B. 641; Heyhoe v. Burge, (1850) 9 C. B.
431 semble.
"Buford v. Lewis, (1908) 87 Ark. 412, 112 S. W. 963; Rowland v.
Long, (1876) 45 Md. 439; Bailey v. Clark, (1828) 6 Pick. (Mass.) 372
semble; Hunter v. Conrad, (1896) 18 Mont. 177, 44 Pac. 523 semble; Jeter
v. Burgwin, (1893) 113 N. C. 157, 18 S. E. 113 semble; Southern Fertilizer
Co. v. Reames, (1890) 105 N. C. 283, 11 S. E. 467 semble; Sheridan v.
Medara, (1855) 10 N. J. Eq. 769; Leggett v. Hyde, (1874) 58 N. Y. 272;
Hackett v. Stanley, (1889) 115 N. Y. 625, 22 N. E. 745. Wood and Oliver
v. Vallette and Lewis, (1857) 7 Ohio St. 172; Purviance v. McClintee,(1820) 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 259; Gill v. Kuhn, (1821) 6 Serg. & R.. (Pa.)
332 semble; Kelley Island Lime and Transport Co. v. Masterson, (1906)
100 Tex. 38, 93 S. W. 427; Rosenfield v. Haight, (1881) 53 Wis. 260, 10
N. W. 378; see Story, Partnership, ch. IV.
1.(1860) 8 H. L. Cas. 268. This was followed in cases including: Re
English and Irish Church and University Assurance Society, (1862) 1 Hem.
& M. 79, 1 New Rep. 192,7 L. T. 669, 11 W. R. 225; Bullen v. Sharp, (1865)
L. R. 1 C. P. 86, Har. & Ruth. 117, 35 L. J. P. C. 105, 14 L. T. 72, 12 Jur.
N. S. 247, 14 W. R. 338; Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wards, (1872)
L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 9 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 214; Badeley v. Consolidated Bank.(1888) 38 Ch. Div. 238, 57 L. J. Ch. 468, 59 L. T. 419, 36 W. R. 745.
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American states of the partnership as to third persons doctrine,
but it has in some cases had a counteracting effect.14
Legislative relief against this doctrine of liability as partner
on the part of the investor, which was sometimes found to be
economically undesirable and resting on precedent only,1" took
two forms. In England what was known as Lord Bovill's Act
was adopted in 1865.16 This provided for a loan of money to a
trader under a written agreement with profit sharing by the lender
and without liability beyond the amount invested. In several
cases the Act was held to be no protection to the lender because
powers of control vested in the lender under the agreement made
him a partner in fact. 17
Similar legislation was adopted in Pennsylvania in 1870, and
several cases of unsuccessful attempts to comply with the act oc-
curred.18
14Meehan v. Valentine, (1892) 145 -U. S. 611, 12 Sup. Ct. 972, 36 L.
Ed. 835; Ellison v. Stuart, (1899) 2 Pen. (Del.) 179, 43 At. 836; Wil-
liams v. Soutter, (1858) 7 Iowa 435; Smith v. Knight, (1873) 71 I1.
148, 22 Am. Rep. 94; Estabrook v. Woods, (1906) 192 Mass. 499, 78 N. E.
538; Beecher v. Bush, (1881) 45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 785; Thillman v.
Benton, (1895) 82 Md. 64, 33 AtI. 485; Wild v. Davenport, (1886) 48
N. J. L. 128, 7 Atl. 295; Richardson v. Hughitt, (1879) 76 N. Y. 77; East-
man v. Clark, (1873) 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192; Harvey v. Childs,
(1876) 28 Oh. St. 319; Boston & Col. Smelting Co. v. Smith, (1880) 13
R. 1. 27.
A distinction has been made between sharing profits and receiving com-
pensation for services equal to a share of profits, which was approved by
Story, Partnership, sec. 52, but criticized by various courts. See Miller v.
Bartlett, (1827) 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 137; Buzard v. First National Bank,
(1886) 67 Tex. 83, 2 S. W. 54.
15Edwards v. Tracy, (1869) 62 Pa. St. 374; Leggett v. Hyde, (1874)
58 N. Y. 272.
1628 & 29 Vic. ch. 86. The act commences with the statement, "Whereas
it is expedient to amend the law relating to partnership." The Act was
occasionally referred to erroneously as a Limited Partnership Act. See
Pollock, Essays on Jurisprudence and Ethics 104.
It not only provided for the creditor-debtor relation by written agree-
ment but provided that no partnership liability should result from compen-
sating a servant or agent by a share of profits, or from paying a widow
or child of a deceased partner an annuity out of profits of the one continu-
ing the trade, or from paying one a portion of profits as consideration for
the sale of the good will of a business. These latter provisions were in-
cluded in the English Partnership Act, 1896, 53-54 Vict. ch. 39, as part of
the rules for determining the existence of a partnership, and were repro-
duced in the Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 7 (4).
1TPooley v. Driver, (1876) 5 Ch. Div. 458, 46 L. J. Ch. 466, 36 L. T.
79, 25 W. R. 162; Ex parte Delhasse, (1878) 7 Ch. Div. 511, 47 L. J. Bey.
65, 38 L. T. 106, 26 W. R. 338; Frowde v. Williams, (1886) 56 L. J. Q. B.
62, 56 L. T. 441.
'
8 April 6, 1870, Pennsylvania, Public Laws 1870, page 56. Wessels v.
Weiss, (1895) 166 Pa. St. 490, 31 AtI. 247; Poundstone v. Hamburger,
(1891) 139 Pa. St. 319, 20 AtI. 1054; Compare Waverley Nat'l Bank v.
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The other form of legislative relief from the partnership as
to third persons doctrine as applied to investors was the adoption
of limited partnership acts beginning in 1822.10 Under these acts
if certain conditions were complied with the investor, called a
limited partner, could risk his investment in return for a share
in profits without further liability. But by express provision of
the acts liability as general partners was imposed on all the asso-
ciates for various defects in compliance ith the statutes, as false
statements in the certificate filed,2 0 failure to file the certificate
at all,2 failure to record it in a county in which a branch was es-
tablished 22 or to which the principal office was removed. 23  Aside
from express statutory liability the view generally taken in the
courts was that the limited partner was essentially a general
partner with the privilege of limited liability on condition that all
the requirements of the act were satisfied, and failure to satisfy
any of them left him in the status of a general partner as regards
liabilities to third persons. 2' The New York courts, however,
showed a tendency in later decisions to impose liability only where
the statutes expressly required it.2 5  In a few other cases of fail-
Hall, (1892) 150 Pa. St. 466, 24 Atl. 665; Jordan v. Patrick, (1903) 207 Pa.
St. 245, 56 Atl. 538; Hart v. Kelley, (1877) 83 Pa. St. 286.
19New York, Laws 1822, page 259, discussed in Ames v. Downing,
(1850) 1 Bradf. Sur. (N.Y.) 321. The Connecticut act of the same year
is discussed in Clapp v. Lacey, (1868) 35 Conn. 463. Pennsylvania adopted
an act in 1836, Public Laws 1836, page 143. Cases under it are collected in
2 Pennsylvania Purd. Dig. Stats., 13th ed., 2299 et seq.
The acts now in force other than the uniform limited partnership act
are collected in the appendix to 8 Uniform Laws Annotated, Limited Part-
nership.20Under statutory provisions that "all the persons interested in such
partnership shall be liable for all the engagements thereon as general part-
ners." Andrews v. Schott, (1848) 10 Pa. St. 47; Richardson v. Hogg. (1861)
38 Pa. St. 153. As to who are persons interested, see Crehan v. Megargel,
(1922) 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296, discussed in Warren, Corporate Ad-
vantages without Incorporation 311 et. seq.
Another form of statute provided that the result of false statements is
that "the partuershin shall be deemed general." Smith v. Artall, (1844)
6 Hill (N.Y.) 479: Van Ingen v. Whitman. (1875) 62 N. Y. 513.2
'Henkel v. Heyman, (1878) 91 Il. 96, certificate taken to office but
removed before it was recorded. See contra, Manhattan Co. v. Leimbeer,
(1888) 108 N. Y. 578, 15 N. E. 712.22 0'Connor v. Graff, (1919) 186 App. Div. 116, 173 N. Y. S. 730.23Riner v. Poppenhausen, (1870) 43 N. Y. 68.24
"The question, therefore is, have the members of the firm complied
with the terms prescribed by the statute? For, unless the conditions of
the act are substantially observed, all the defendants are general partners."
Rogers J. in Andrews v. Schott, (1848) 10 Pa. St. 47; Madison County
Bank v. Gould, (1843) 5 Hill (N.Y.) 309; Richardson v. Hogg, (1861) 38
Pa. St. 153.25Buck v. Alley, (1895) 145 N. Y. 488, 40 N. E. 236: Buckle v. Iler,
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ure to comply with the statutes the status of general partner for
all purposes was not imposed.
Neither Lord Bovill's Act 6 nor the limited partnership acts
prior to the uniform limited partnership act have proved to be
adequate protection to the investor because of the risk of liability
in event of non-compliance with the technical statutory require-
ments. Relief appears now to be afforded along two lines, ex-
pressed in the two uniform acts. The uniform partnership act
follows the doctrine of the group of cases headed by Cox v. Hick-
mHan 27 in providing in section 7 containing "Rules for Determin-
ing the Existence of a Partnership. (1) Except as provided by
section 16, persons who are not partners as to each other are not
partners as to third persons."2 and further,-"(4) The receipt by
a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evi-
dence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference
shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise,
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment
vary with the profits of the business."
Under these rules it appears that a status similar to that of lim-
ited partner can be created without compliance with any statutory
forms, and that one may invest money subject to the risks of the
business sharing profits without liability for losses provided there
is no participation in the management. The uniform limited part-
nership act provides for the consequences of defective organiza-
tion in section 11:
(1903) 40 Misc. Rep. 314, 81 N. Y. S. 631; see note (1923) 36 Harv. L.
Rev. 1016.2 6An estoppel to enforce personal liability of the limited partner has
been maintained against creditors who have dealt with the association as a
limited partnership, Tracy v. Tuffly, (1890) 134 U. S. 206, 10 Sup. Ct. 527,
33 L. Ed. 879; Allegheny National Bank v. Bailey, (1892) 147 Pa. St. 111,
23 Atl. 439. Compare California, Civ. Code, sec. 2503 and see Warren,
Corporate Advantages without Incorporation 309.
As between the parties themselves there is no objection to carrving out
their terms of association as regards their mutual obligations and rights.
In re Allen's Estate, (1889) 41 Minn. 430, 43 N. W. 382 semble.
The intended limited partner is not liable for torts, but only for con-
tractural debts of the associates, McKnight v. Ratcliff, (1863) 44 Pa. St.
156. The intended limited partner is not liable as partner bv estoppel after
failure to give notice of withdrawal. Tilge v. Brooks, (1889) 124 Pa. St.
178, 16 Atl. 746.27See notes 13 and 14.
2SThis clause in a section entitled "Rules for Determining the Existence
of a Partnership" seems somewhat out of place, since it deals with liabili-
ties of persons as between whom a partnership relation does not exist.
Section 16 deals with partner by estoppel.
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"Status of Person Erroneously Believing Himself a Limited
Partner. A person who has contributed to the capital of a busi-
ness conducted by a person or partnership, erroneously believing
that he has become a lirfited partner in a limited partnership, is
not, by reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited partner,
a general partner with the person or in the partnership carrying
on the business, or bound by the obligations of such person or
partnership; provided, that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly
renounces his interest in the profits of the business, or other com-
pensation by way of income."
Each of these means of defense was held effective in the case of
Giles v. Vette.2 9 Marcuse and Morris proposed to form a limited
partnership to take over the business of a former partnership
engaged in the brokerage business in which Marcuse was a part-
ner. They intended to have several limited partners, but finding
that the rules of the New York Exchange prohibited member
firms having more than two, decided to associate with Hecht and
Finn as limited partners, who in turn were trustees for various
other contributors. 0 An agreement was executed and filed July
2, 1917, in Chicago. July 1, the new uniform limited partner-
ship act became effective, superseding the former Illinois Act of
1874, under which the parties supposed they were organizing.
The new uniform act did not authorize limited partnerships for
the stock brokerage business, and the agreement was not in the
form nor filed at the office required by the new act. The part-
nership became bankrupt, and the limited partners, in attempted
compliance with section 11 of the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act, paid into court the profits which they had received.
The district court adjudicated as bankrupt, along with the gen-
eral partners, the limited partners and their beneficiaries. On pe-
tition to review and revise, the circuit court of appeals, seventh
circuit, eliminated from the order of adjudication all except
Marcuse and Morris. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. In the circuit court of appeals, Anschuler, J., with whom
Page, J. concurred, held that the limited partners were entitled
to the benefit of section 11 of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, holding it applicable to a partnership which by reason of its
purposes could not have been formed under that Act. It was also
29(1923) 263 ,U. S. 553, 44 Sup. Ct. 157, 68 L. Ed. 441, affirming In
re Marcuse & Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1922) 281 Fed. 928.
3oSee also as to combination of limited partnership and trust Crehan v.
Megargel, (1922) 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296. Compare as a method of
investment without risk of liability the sub-partnership, discussed in Row-
ley, Risk Evasion Through Sub-partnership, (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 674.
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held that the petitioners, if not entitled to any protection under
the later Act, were not general partners, not being co-owners of
the business within the definition and rules contained in the uni-
form partnership act, and not being partners in fact could not be
partners as to third persons so as to be subject to adjudication as
partners.
The bankruptcy act provides that "A partnership, during the
continuance of the partnership business, or after its dissolution
and before final settlement thereof, may be adjudicated a bank-
rupt." 31 In this case the petitions of creditors had alleged the two
limited partners and their beneficiaries to be general partners.
Prior to this case it had been often stated in the lower federal
courts that only partners in fact can be adjudicated bankrupt in a
petition against the partnership. 32  Partners by estoppel were not
so adjudicated. 3  It has been held that one who is liable as a
partner to third persons by reason of profit sharing cannot be
included as partner in bankruptcy proceedings against the real
owner of the business.' 4 There was, however, some authority to
the effect that the limited partner in a defective limited partner-
ship, being liable to creditors, could be included in partnership
proceedings in bankruptcy.35
The.determining issue was stated by Anschuler, J., to be
"whether under the above stated facts petitioners are liable as
general partners with Marcuse and Morris." 3  Mr. Justice Butler
in the Supreme Court stated that "The question for decision is
whether any of the persons named, other than Marcuse and Mor-
ris, are liable as general partners."3 7  In both courts, the peti-
tioners were held not subject to adjudication not merely because
"1July 1, 1898, ch. 541, sec. 5, 30 Stat. at L. 547, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 23.
1 Mason's .U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 23.
32Jones v. Burnham, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1905) 138 Fed. 986: Buffalo
Mining Co. v. Lewisburg, (D.C. Pa. 1908) 159 Fed. 319; 1 Collier, Bank-
ruptcy 231.
33In re C. F. Beckwith & Co., (D.C. Pa. 1904) 130 Fed. 475 semble:
In re Hudson Clothing Co. (D.C. Me. 1906) 148 Fed. 305 semble; In re
Pinson, (D.C. Ala. 1910) 180 Fed. 787; In re Kaplan, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1916) 234 Fed. 866 semble; In re Kuntz, (D.C. Pa. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 198
reviewing authorities.
However, Butler, J., in Giles v. Vette took occasion to demonstrate that
the petitioners were not partners by estoppel. (1924) 263 U. S. 553, 561, 44
Sup. Ct. 157, 68 L. Ed. 441.
34 1n re Kenney, (D.C. N.Y. 1899) 97 Fed. 554.
35In re Merrill, (C.C. N.Y. 1874) 12 Blatchford 221. Fed. Cas. No.
9467; see also In re Rasmussen, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1923) 287 Fed. 860.86(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1922) 281 Fed. 928, 932.
37(1924) 263 U. S. 553, 554, 44 Sup. Ct. 158, 68 L. Ed. 444.
ARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS NECESSARY!
they were not partners in fact but because they were not liable as
partners to creditors. The case is therefore authority for the
non-liability to third persons of one who enters into an intended
limited partnership as a limited partner. The result of the case
appears to be the virtual adoption of the commenda as an in-
formal common law institution, by reason of the abolishment of
the doctrine of liability to creditors of persons not partners in
fact save in the case of estoppel. There are other cases which
have reached a similar result under the uniform partnership act
and on the authority of this case.3" It should not be understood
that the decision in Giles v. Vette as to the non-liability of an in-
vestor is a radical advance upon previous decisions, some of which
have been cited heretofore.3 9 The provisions of the uniform part-
nership act relied upon in the opinion are merely declaratory of
the common law of a majority of the jurisdictions. The unique
feature of Giles v. Vette is that the parties intended to create
inter se the relation of limited partnership under the former Illi-
nois limited partnership act. The case is also important as a
decision of the United States Supreme Court applying the uni-
form partnership act as an aid to interpretation of the bankruptcy
act.40
In Giles v. Vette the Supreme Court also approved the other
ground for the decision of the circuit court of appeals, that the
intended limited partners were entitled to the benefit of section
11 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. This section does
away with the risk of personal liability being imposed on a person
who has in good faith attempted to become a limited partner and
38Petition of Williams, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1924) 297 Fed. 696. By written
agreement Williams contributed capital to a firm, in which he was de-
scribed as being a "silent or special" partner. He was to be inactive, have
no share in ownership but to share profits in addition to interest. He was
held not subject to adjudication as a partner.
In re Mission Farms Dairy, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 346.
One King supplied the entire capital for a dairy business, operated by Hult-
gren and wife, who were to receive from income $150 monthly compensa-
tion, turning over to King the balance of earnings until he was repaid his
investment. They held the property in trust for him. King was held not
subject to adjudication as partner with the Hultgrens.
Martin v. Peyton, (1927) 246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E. 77, lenders of se-
curities to a stock brokerage firm, in return for a share of profits and with
limited powers of supervision and control, held not to be partners in fact,
and not to be liable for partnership debts, there being no partnership by
estoppel.
s9See note 14.40Compare applications in bankruptcy of the uniform fraudulent con-
veyance act. Davis v. Hudson Trust Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1928) 28 F.
(2d) 740; In re Babylon Estates, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1928) 30 F. (2d) 372.
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is not responsible for the defective compliance with the statutory
requirements. This provision was held to be broad enough in its
scope to apply to a partnership which could not be organized
under the Act, and which the associates did not intend to or-
ganize under the Act. In the circuit court of appeals, Evans, J.,
dissented as to both grounds of the decision.
4
'
With this protection against liability of persons bona fide be-
lieving themselves to be limited partners, this form of organiza-
tion is much safer than the limited partnership under the former
acts.42 By other provisions of the uniform limited partnership
act the limited partner is given certain rights, including the right
to information 43 and to force a dissolution and winding up,"4 and
limitations are placed on the general partners' powers. 4" To at-
tempt to give by contract, without compliance with the Act, all
the rights given the limited partner under the Act might by some
courts be held to constitute such control as to create a partner-
ship in fact, in spite of the case of Giles v. Vette and those that
follow it. It is likely, therefore, that in the interests of security
and certainty associations will be organized under the Act, even
though it be an unnecessary precaution as regards exemption from
personal liability of the inactive investor.
41(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1922, 281 Fed. 928, 941.
42See annotation by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, sec. 1; Lewis, The Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, (1917) 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 715.
43Sec. 10.
44Sec. 16(4).
"Sec. 9.
